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INTRODUCTION
The doctrine of exhaustion plays an important role in European
intellectual property law to preserve the free movement of products
protected by intellectual property rights.
However, despite the
seemingly uncomplicated principles of this doctrine, a high degree of
uncertainty as to its proper doctrinal foundations persists as it is applied
in a variety of different legal contexts. This Article traces the
application of the doctrine of exhaustion through the different legal
contexts in which it is applied, assesses the status of the doctrine,
evaluates the interpretation and scope of the doctrine within European
1
Community law, and aims to highlight pertinent issues regarding the
doctrine in relation to both domestic and cross-border issues. The
history of the treatment of the doctrine of exhaustion evidences a
remarkably complex structure: the formulation of the exhaustion rule
2
under Article 30 EC was subsequently incorporated into secondary
intellectual property legislation, and the European exhaustion rule was
implemented into national laws. This has made it difficult to formulate
more refined rules governing licensing provisions restricting the free
circulation of goods. This has also resulted in uncertainty as to the
proper definition of the exhaustion rule and its guiding principles. As
discussed in this Article, it has also resulted in an unintelligible equation
between the basic freedoms to provide, on the one hand, trade and
services under European Community law and, on the other hand, to
provide classification of economic rights in intellectual property.
I. THE EMERGENCE OF THE EXHAUSTION RULE
Article 28 EC incorporates the principle of free movement of goods,
and it prohibits quantitative restrictions on imports between Member
3
States and all other measures of equivalent effect. Under Article 30
EC, however, national law may derogate from the principle of free
movement of goods if the measure in question is justified and
proportional in relation to the impact of the prima facie contravention
of Articles 28 and 29 EC and the specific objective the national rule
4
seeks to accomplish. In relation to intellectual property cases, the
1. See Treaty Establishing the European Community, Nov. 10, 1997, 1997 O.J. (C 340) 3
[hereinafter EC Treaty].
2. EC Treaty art. 30.
3. See id. art. 28.
4. Id. arts. 28–30; see Case 120/78, Rewe-Zentral AG v. Bundesmonopolverwaltung für
Branntwein (Cassis de Dijon), 1979 E.C.R. 649.
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European Court of Justice (ECJ) has established that a violation of
Article 28 EC may be justified only if the existence of the right is
5
concerned, which was later specified so as to relate to the specific
6
subject matter. The doctrine of exhaustion has been employed as to
7
underpin these distinctions.
Intellectual property lawyers often deem the jurisprudence
regarding the interface of intellectual property and the principle of free
movement of goods as an unswerving interpretation of the proprietary
scope of territorial intellectual property rights within a European
context. Thereby, this perception has created a notion that precludes
any derogation from the principle of free movement of goods. One
reason for such a result is the lowest common denominator solution, as
formulated by the ECJ in relation to territorial restrictions. The free
circulation of goods is consistently favored.
These various issues share common ground:
most of the
uncertainties concerning the application of the exhaustion rule stem
from the ambiguities that exist regarding the status and treatment of
intellectual property rights under European law. Under national laws,
intellectual property rights remain territorial, theoretically allowing for
restrictions in relation to preventing parallel and reimports and, to a
certain degree, allowing for restrictions on the product market in which
8
protection may be offered. The ECJ has applied the provisions on
9
contractual restrictions on European Community trade as well as the
10
free movement of goods principle in order to curtail the control of
11
owners of intellectual property. This jurisprudence has inadvertently
created a notion of exhaustion as a fundamental principle of a distinct

5. Joined Cases 56 & 58/64, Etablissements Consten, S.A.R.L. v. Comm’n, 1966 E.C.R.
299, 333–43.
6. Case 78/70, Deutsche Grammophon Gesellschaft mbH v. Metro-SB-Großmärkte
GmbH & Co. KG, 1971 E.C.R. 487, 499–500.
7. Id. at 498–99; Etablissements Consten, 1966 E.C.R. at 338.
8. See infra Part IV.
9. EC Treaty art. 81.
10. Id. arts. 28–30.
11. For an application of the provisions on competition law, see Etablissements Consten,
1966 E.C.R. 299. See also Case 40/70, Sirena v. Eda, 1971 E.C.R. 69. A variety of cases have
also applied the provisions of Articles 28 through 30 EC (formerly Articles 30–36). See Case
9/93, IHT Internationale Heiztechnik GmbH v. Ideal-Standard GmbH, 1994 E.C.R. I-2789;
Case 19/84, Pharmon BV v. Hoechst AG, 1985 E.C.R. 2281; Case 144/81, Keurkoop BV v.
Nancy Kean Gifts BV, 1982 E.C.R. 2853; Case 187/80, Merck & Co. v. Stephar BV, 1981
E.C.R. 2063; Joined Cases 55 & 57/80, Musik-Vertrieb Membran GmbH v. GEMA, 1981
E.C.R. 147; Case 15/74, Centrafarm BV v. Sterling Drug Inc., 1974 E.C.R. 1147.
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“European intellectual property law.”
The interpretation of this
jurisprudence as establishing a rather rigid exhaustion rule has, thus, led
to the reformulation of a European exhaustion principle in secondary
legislation, which—in the case, for example, of directives—is then
transformed into the body of national laws. However, it remains an
open question as to whether the ECJ truly established rules pertaining
to intellectual property rights that inadvertently—or, at least,
reflexively—have led to a higher degree of harmonization.
This Article argues that this is not the case. The exhaustion doctrine
has been utilized as a pattern of argument by the ECJ to arrive at
decisions that maintain the underlying aim of establishing a common
market. In this regard, this Article undertakes analyses of the status of
the exhaustion rule as applied in different scenarios in order to identify
the rule’s boundaries.
The application of the exhaustion rule, as established by the ECJ,
concerns the loss of control in the exercise of distribution or importation
rights over subsequent acts of distribution. The assessment of the
exercise of intellectual property rights does not pose many difficulties.
The ECJ, early on, purported that it was competent to scrutinize the
exercise of intellectual property rights; the existence of intellectual
property rights, however, remained a matter of national law and was not
13
to be called into question. Although this distinction between the ECJ’s
role with respect to issues of the exercise versus the existence of
intellectual property rights met with substantial criticism for being too
vague and tautological—indeed, a right that exists but cannot be freely
exercised is a nudum ius—the systematic approach of the ECJ merely
evidences that the conflict must be resolved under the existing language
14
of Articles 28, 29 and 30 EC.
In order to frame the current debate regarding the status of the
exhaustion doctrine, a brief historical outline of the ECJ’s treatment of
territorial intellectual property rights is in order. The first cases to
12. This is evidenced, in particular, by the inclusion of the exhaustion principle as
applicable to physical goods placed in the market. The restriction of the exhaustion principle
to intra-Community trade has since been established in case law. Case 479/04, Laserdisken
ApS v. Kulturministeriet, 2006 ECJ CELEX LEXIS 447 (Sept. 12, 2006).
13. Initially, commentators expressed doubts as to whether the European Community
was permitted to restrict the exercise of intellectual property rights given the general property
safeguards under Article 295 EC (formerly Article 222). See Friedrich-Karl Beier, Industrial
Property and the Free Movement of Goods in the Internal European Market, 21 INT’L REV.
INTELL. PROP. & COMPETITION L. 131 (1990).
14. Karen Banks & Giuliano Marenco, Intellectual Property and the Community Rules
on Free Movement: Discrimination Unearthed, 15 EUR. L. REV. 224 (1990).
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address the interaction between the EC Treaty provisions and the
exercise of territorial intellectual property rights regarding the scope
and effect of exclusive licensing agreements were resolved under the
rules on competition law, in particular Article 81(1) EC (formerly
15
Article 85(1)).
The ECJ emphasized that license agreements
containing territorial restriction clauses, which allowed the owners of
the intellectual property rights to prevent reimports, violated the rules
16
on competition. In the absence of an “agreement,” as required under
Article 81 EC, the ECJ eventually began to apply the provision on the
free movement of goods. Article 28 EC (formerly Article 30) prohibits
Member States from imposing “[q]uantitative restrictions on imports
17
and all measures having equivalent effect.” The ECJ has consistently
determined, for example, that attempts to exercise intellectual property
rights on the strength of their territorial effect constituted such
18
equivalent effect.
Article 30 EC (formerly Article 36) then allows a derogation from
the principle of free movement of goods for the protection of industrial
19
property. However, when first applied by the ECJ, the derogation for
industrial property rights did not provide a blanket justification for
every conceivable exercise of a national intellectual property right. In
the context of the derogation provided for under Article 30 EC, the ECJ
generally instituted a balancing test—this balancing test then later
provided the basis for the European exhaustion doctrine. In order to
demarcate the boundaries between a permitted exercise of an
intellectual property right and the concerns of the internal market, the
ECJ initially based its decisions on the distinction between the existence
and exercise of intellectual property rights. It held that, whereas the
existence of rights remained unfettered by European Community law,
the ECJ was competent under the EC Treaty to evaluate the exercise of
20
such rights.
Such “exercise” was, in turn, to be evaluated in
accordance with the specific subject matter test; accordingly,
derogations from the free movement of goods principle could only be

15. See EC Treaty art. 81(1).
16. Case 170/83, Hydrotherm Gerätebau GmbH v. Compact del Dott. Ing. Mario
Andreoli, 1984 E.C.R. 2999; Case 58/80, Dansk Supermarked A/S v. A/S Imerco, 1981 E.C.R.
191; Sirena, 1971 E.C.R. 69; Etablissements Consten, 1966 E.C.R. 299.
17. EC Treaty art. 28.
18. Joined Cases 55 & 57/80, Musik-Vertrieb Membran GmbH v. GEMA, 1981 E.C.R.
147.
19. See EC Treaty art. 30.
20. See, e.g., Case 16/74, Centrafarm BV v. Winthrop BV, 1974 E.C.R. 1183.
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justified to the extent that the exercise of intellectual property rights
21
was within the “essence” of the right, giving the ECJ an extremely
flexible tool with which to overcome the adverse effects of territorial
intellectual property rights and, thus, giving preference to the free
movement of goods principle. Hence, once the exercise of a national
intellectual property right could not be considered to be necessary in
order to maintain the specific subject matter or essence of the right, the
right holder was no longer permitted to rely on it and, consequently, any
further control was curtailed and deemed an improper exercise of such a
22
right.
Thereafter, the actual concept of exhaustion was first
expressed—as far as can be discerned by this author—in the 1978 case
of Hoffmann-La Roche & Co. AG v. Centrafarm Vertriebsgesellschaft
23
Pharmazeutischer Erzeugnisse mbH.
A. Territorial Restrictions and Competition Law
The two main block exemptions dealing with intellectual property
24
rights—the Technology Transfer Regulation (TTR) and the Vertical
25
Restraints Regulation (VRR) —may indirectly affect the scope of the
European exhaustion doctrine in that they permit certain degrees of
territorial protection. The existence of two divergent block exemptions,
21. See Case 78/70, Deutsche Grammophon Gesellschaft mbH v. Metro-SBGroßmärkte GmbH & Co. KG, 1971 E.C.R. 487. Later cases also defined “specific subject
matter” with regard to trademarks. See Case 102/77, Hoffmann-La Roche & Co. AG v.
Centrafarm Vertriebsgesellschaft Pharmazeutischer Erzeugnisse mbH, 1978 E.C.R. 1139
(considering the essential function of the trademark to be the guarantee of origin to the
consumer or ultimate user); Centrafarm, 1974 E.C.R. 1183 (securing the guarantee to market
the product for the first time).
22. The issue of what constitutes a proper exercise of such a right is a matter of law for
the ECJ to decide. See Case 144/81, Keurkoop BV v. Nancy Kean Gifts BV, 1982 E.C.R.
2853.
23. Hoffmann-La Roche, 1978 E.C.R. 1139. The ECJ did not, however, introduce the
exhaustion principle as a novel, conceptual approach; rather, it stated that the principle had
already existed in case law related to Article 30 EC. Id. Subsequent case law then
consistently and expressly reaffirmed the exhaustion rule. See Case C-200/96, Metronome
Musik GmbH v. Music Point Hokamp GmbH, 1998 E.C.R. I-1953; Case C-352/95, Phytheron
Int’l SA v. Bourdon SA, 1997 E.C.R. I-1729; Joined Cases C-267 & 268/95, Merck & Co. v.
Primecrown Ltd., 1996 E.C.R. I-6285; Joined Cases C-427, 429 & 436/93, Bristol-Myers
Squibb v. Paranova A/S, 1996 E.C.R. I-3457; Case 9/93, IHT Internationale Heiztechnik
GmbH v. Ideal-Standard GmbH, 1994 E.C.R. I-2789; Case 395/87, Ministère Pub. v.
Tournier, 1989 E.C.R. 2521; Case 341/87, EMI Electrola GmbH v. Patricia Im, 1989 E.C.R.
79; Case 35/87, Thetford Corp. v. Fiamma, 1988 E.C.R. 3585; Case 19/84, Pharmon BV v.
Hoechst AG, 1985 E.C.R. 2281.
24. Commission Regulation 772/2004, 2004 O.J. (L 123) 11 (EC) [hereinafter 2004
TTR].
25. Commission Regulation 2790/1999, 1999 O.J. (L 336) 21 (EC) [hereinafter VRR].
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which may potentially cover intellectual property provisions, leads to a
high level of uncertainty in the application of the prevailing principles of
law. Under the new 2004 TTR, qualifying contractual restraints are no
26
longer “white-listed,” as they had been under the 1996 TTR.
In regards to the issue of exhaustion, the 2004 TTR revises the
language of the 1996 TTR, which had outlined the application of the
provisions to circumstances including “a reservation by the licensor of
the right to exercise the rights conferred by a patent to oppose the
exploitation of the technology by the licensee outside the licensed
27
territory.” This clause was outlined in Article 2(1)(14) of the 1996
TTR and interpreted as an exclusion of exhaustion between licensor and
28
licensee. If this were true, it might signify a shift in the notion of the
European exhaustion doctrine.
B. Technology Transfer and Vertical Restraints
29

The 1996 TTR permitted certain types of territorial restrictions.
30
The 1996 TTR, however, was repealed by the 2004 TTR, and the 2004
TTR now follows a rather open regime in that it permits any territorial
31
restriction provided that certain preconditions are met.
The new
regulation has a wider scope of application in that it covers software
32
licenses as well as patent and know-how licensing agreements. Article
33
81(1) EC is now inapplicable provided that the licensor does not enjoy
a market share of more than thirty percent of the relevant product and
technology market, or, in the case of competing undertakings, the

26. Compare 2004 TTR, supra note 24, with Commission Regulation 240/96, art. 10(1)–
(4), 1996 O.J. (L 31) 2 (EC) [hereinafter 1996 TTR].
27. See 1996 TTR, supra note 26, art. 2(1)(14).
28. STEVEN D. ANDERMAN, EC COMPETITION LAW AND INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY
RIGHTS: THE REGULATION OF INNOVATION 97 (1998); VALENTINE KORAH, AN
INTRODUCTORY GUIDE TO EC COMPETITION LAW AND PRACTICE 298 (7th ed. 2000). The
2004 TTR apparently allows for territorial reservation for buyers. See VALENTINE KORAH,
AN INTRODUCTORY GUIDE TO EC COMPETITION LAW AND PRACTICE 287 (8th ed. 2004)
[hereinafter KORAH, GUIDE].
29. KORAH, supra note 28, at 298.
30. Compare 2004 TTR, supra note 24, with 1996 TTR, supra note 26.
31. The 1996 TTR only prohibited restrictions on passive sales. It permitted a ban on
the licensor from licensing third parties in the licensee’s territory and a ban on the licensor’s
exploitation of the patent and know-how in that territory. See 1996 TTR, supra note 26, art.
1(1)(1)–(2). Regarding open exclusive licenses, see Case 258/78, Nungesser KG v. Comm’n,
1982 E.C.R. 2015. See also 1996 TTR, supra note 26, art. 1(1)(4) (allowing certain territorial
restrictions against competing licensees in territories within the common market).
32. 2004 TTR, supra note 24, art. 1(b).
33. EC Treaty art. 81(1).
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parties do not have a combined market share of more than twenty
34
percent of the relevant markets.
Article 4 of the 2004 TTR contains a “black list” of exceptions
relating to certain types of market separations and prohibitions on
35
subsequent innovations. A rigid market share approach, however, is
prone to cause problems. Determining the correct market share in the
case of new technology markets is extremely intricate, and new
technologies will easily lead to a significant market share—in the case of
software, it may well be argued that new applications will render the
licensor dominant even for the entire life of the product. The effect will
be to advise caution because a proper definition of markets for
36
technological products or information markets is far from clear.
37
Accordingly, a
The TTR allows for closed, exclusive licenses.
licensee may be restricted from selling directly in to the licensor’s
38
territory. Such a territory is not defined by borders, but encompasses
all territories in which the licensor exploits the invention, which includes
39
territories for which the licensor has appointed a wholesaler. Direct
sales undertaken by a licensee in to any such territory would, therefore,
constitute a breach of contract. The 2004 TTR now distinguishes
40
between competing and noncompeting undertakings.
Where the
undertaking parties are competing undertakings, they may enter into
agreements under which the licensor restricts production to one
41
territory. This provision does not appear to affect parallel imports,
although one may undertake to advance a position that a prohibited

34. 2004 TTR, supra note 24, art. 3.
35. See id. art. 4. Territorial restrictions do not fall within the hardcore restrictions. Id.
art. 4(1)(c)(iv).
36. Guido Westkamp, Balancing Database Sui Generis Right Protection with European
Monopoly Control Under Article 82 E.C., 22 EUR. COMPETITION L. REV. 13, 16–17 (2001).
37. 2004 TTR, supra note 24.
38. 1996 TTR, supra note 26, art. 1.
39. Id.
40. 2004 TTR, supra note 24, art. 3.
Where the undertakings . . . are competing undertakings, the exemption . . . shall
apply [if] . . . the combined market share of the parties does not exceed
20% . . . . Where the undertakings . . . are not competing undertakings, the
exemption . . . shall apply [if] . . . the market share of each . . . does not exceed
30% . . . .
Id.
41. Id. art. 4(1)(c)(ii). Provided that the licensed technology is produced within one or
more technical fields of use or one or more product markets, the licensees cannot be
restricted from producing for different purposes outside such territory. Commission Notice,
2004 O.J. (C 101) 2 [hereinafter TTR Guidelines].
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restriction of the licensee to produce in another territory gives rise to a
42
right to market or distribute there. The reason for this is that outside
the scope of a permitted production restriction—in other words, one
that clearly sets out the conditions in relation to fields of use or product
markets—intellectual property rights will be unenforceable and subject
43
to scrutiny under Article 81(1) EC.
With respect to the issue of
consent, the ECJ took the view that the license, as such, constitutes
consent within the meaning of the exhaustion rule; unless the restriction
is exempt, any control right over the further distribution of a protected
44
product is relinquished between licensor and licensee. The licensee
can, however, be restricted from granting sublicenses outside such
45
territory. The prerogative is not limited to the same restraints as an
obligation on the licensee to only produce within defined technical fields
of use or product markets. It remains an open question as to whether
this would affect a sublicense granted for the purpose of producing
outside a field of use restriction or for a different product market. The
result, if such a reading were to be adhered to, would be absurd: the
licensor can only effectively restrain a licensee from expanding the
contractual scope to “new” uses, but cannot prevent the same if the
licensee has granted a sublicense.
Under the VRR, a seller of products may impose restrictions on
active sales in to territories reserved to third-party buyers and may also
46
reserve territories to himself or herself. The VRR affects intellectual
property rights only to the extent that they are ancillary provisions in
47
relation to a distribution agreement.
It is uncertain whether this
provides for the cumulative application of the VRR in cases where a
clause is not included under the TTR—by some commentators, this is
42. See 2004 TTR, supra note 24, art. 4.
43. Id.; see EC Treaty art. 81(1).
44. Case 102/77, Hoffmann-La Roche & Co. AG v. Centrafarm Vertriebsgesellschaft
Pharmazeutischer Erzeugnisse mbH, 1978 E.C.R. 1139.
45. See TTR Guidelines, supra note 41, at 17.
46. Under Article 4(b) of the VRR, a seller may restrict
the territory into which, or of the customers to whom, the buyer may sell the
contract goods or services, except:
the restriction of active sales into the exclusive territory or to an exclusive
customer group reserved to the supplier or allocated by the supplier to another
buyer, where such a restriction does not limit sales by the customers of the
buyer.
VRR, supra note 25, art. 4(b).
47. The term “ancillary” was interpreted to mean that the intellectual property right
must not constitute the main object of the contract. See Case T-112/99, Métropole Télévision
v. Comm’n, 2001 E.C.R. II-2459.
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perceived as lex specialis. This requires a rather artificial distinction,
especially in cases where the object of intellectual property protection in
question is not entirely clear: an agreement, for example, pertaining to
the sale of a computer video game would be captured under the TTR, if
the main object of the contract concerned distribution rather than
licensing.
II. BLOCK EXEMPTIONS AND EXHAUSTION
The traditional view of both the European Commission and the ECJ
has been rather hostile toward the effects of territorial market
49
partitioning. The view adopted by the ECJ has persistently referred to
50
the overarching aim of establishing a common market. To that end,
the ECJ has scrutinized licensing agreements under Article 81(1) EC
and, if that provision was determined to be inapplicable, it has
additionally analyzed the compatibility of the agreement with the
51
principle of the free movement of goods. In all cases, the ECJ has
52
relied on the exhaustion of intellectual property rights. In that sense,
both competition rules and the free movement of goods principle are

48. VRR, supra note 25, recital (3).
This category includes vertical agreements for the purchase or sale of goods or
services where these agreements are concluded between non-competing
undertakings, between certain competitors or by certain associations of retailers of
goods; it also includes vertical agreements containing ancillary provisions on the
assignment or use of intellectual property rights . . . .
Id.
49. Commission Decision 76/29, 1976 O.J. (L 6) 8; Commission Decision 75/570, 1975
O.J. (L 249) 27. The ECJ has allowed open exclusive licenses. Case 258/78, Nungesser KG v.
Comm’n, 1982 E.C.R. 2015. Likewise, the Patent Licensing Regulation only allowed
nonexclusive and open exclusive licenses. See Commission Regulation 2349/84, art. 1(1)(1)–
(5), 1984 O.J. (L 219) 15. See generally KORAH, supra note 28, at 283.
50. Case 19/84, Pharmon BV v. Hoechst AG, 1985 E.C.R. 2281; Case 96/75, EMI
Records Ltd. v. CBS Schallplatten GmbH, 1976 E.C.R. 913; Case 78/70, Deutsche
Grammophon Gesellschaft mbH v. Metro-SB-Großmärkte GmbH & Co. KG, 1971 E.C.R.
487.
51. EC Treaty arts. 28–30, 81(1).
52. The ECJ established that Article 36 EC (now Article 30) does not restrict the scope
of application of the competition provisions. See Joined Cases 56 & 58/64, Etablissements
Consten, S.A.R.L. v. Comm’n, 1966 E.C.R. 299. The ECJ later applied Article 36 EC, by way
of analogy, to cases concerning Article 85 EC (now Article 81). See Case 24/67, Parke, Davis
& Co. v. Probel, 1968 E.C.R. 55. Then, it directly applied Articles 30 through 36 EC (now
Articles 28–30) to any exercise of intellectual property rights. See Case 16/74, Centrafarm BV
v. Winthrop BV, 1974 E.C.R. 1183; Case 192/73, Van Zuylen Frères v. Hag AG, 1974 E.C.R.
731; Deutsche Grammophon, 1971 E.C.R. 487; Case 40/70, Sirena v. Eda, 1971 E.C.R. 69.
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taken into account in securing the overarching aim of establishing a
common market.
In apparent contrast to the traditional position on exhaustion,
Article 2(1)(14) of the 1996 TTR indicated that sales contravening
53
white-listed territorial restrictions could be prevented by the owner.
Consequently, exhaustion would not occur, and, in other words, the
54
licensor would be permitted to prevent parallel imports. There is no
guidance, however, under the 2004 TTR, which relies upon a market
threshold approach, although, under Article 4, a territorial reservation
55
by the licensor is still possible. The language of Article 2(1)(14) of the
1996 TTR preserves for the patentee the right to “oppose” the
56
exploitation outside the licensed territory, and the provision expressly
57
refers to the “rights conferred by a patent.” Likewise, as outlined in
Part I.B, the VRR includes provisions for territorial restrictions and
58
may alternatively apply.
If the licensor is permitted to introduce territorial restrictions upon
the licensee, the question still remains as to whether the licensor can
enforce his or her intellectual property rights in cases where the
licensee—or, in cases applying the VRR, the licensee-distributor—has
put goods on the market despite a valid contractual restriction.
A. Scope of Application for Intellectual Property Rights
Territorial restrictions on the resale of protected products may be
59
exempt under either the VRR or the TTR. In relation to licenses for
intellectual property rights, however, the scope of applicability and
relationship between the TTR and VRR are not entirely clear. The
TTR applies to licenses of patents and similar subject matter that the
European Commission deems to be within the realm of technology
60
transfer. Such agreements cannot, however, be simultaneously exempt
61
under the VRR.

53. Article 2(1)(14) provides for “a reservation by the licensor of the right to exercise
the rights conferred by a patent to oppose the exploitation of the technology by the licensee
outside the licensed territory.” 1996 TTR, supra note 26, art. 2(1)(14).
54. See id.
55. See 2004 TTR, supra note 24, art. 4.
56. See 1996 TTR, supra note 26, art. 2(1)(14).
57. Id.
58. See VRR, supra note 25, art. 4(b).
59. See 2004 TTR, supra note 24; VRR; supra note 25.
60. See generally 2004 TTR, supra note 24.
61. See VRR, supra note 25, art. 2(1).
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A patentee may grant a license to manufacture and sell the patented
invention in one territory, market the patent himself or herself, or
appoint an exclusive dealer. In each of these situations, different block
exemptions apply. One related problem that has since been addressed
by the 2004 TTR is that the 1996 TTR afforded a lesser degree of
protection depending on whether the legal relationship fell within the
62
TTR or the VRR.
It followed that an agreement that merely
constituted a distribution contract was outside the scope of the TTR,
even though it might have included a patent license. Such a license is
generally required because the act of selling constitutes the exercise of
an exclusive right. However, the contract may also simply contain an
obligation under which the owner of the patent impliedly waives his or
her right to exercise any propriety rights. From Article 5 of the 2004
TTR, it follows that a contract relating to the supply of a patented
product is not covered under the TTR since the recitals state that the act
63
of exploitation is the main goal for fostering new technologies.
Conversely, the VRR block exemption does not apply to contracts that
have as their primary object the assignment or license of an intellectual
64
property right.
The VRR does not apply to vertical agreements in which the
65
respective provisions on intellectual property are not ancillary.
Because the VRR covers distribution agreements, it follows that a
license introduced simply to allow the sale in the protected territory
constitutes an ancillary provision. The true scope of the term, however,
still remains obscure. Sole supply licenses are covered, although they
66
were, likewise, excluded under the former TTR. Under the VRR,
intellectual property licenses can be part of a vertical agreement as long
67
as they do not constitute the primary object. The term is not defined in
the VRR, but it may be asserted that such an objection would merely
exclude those agreements to which the TTR applied anyway—that is,

62. For instance, a buyer could be given protection from direct sales by other buyers
into his or her own territory under the VRR, but could not be protected from sales by a
licensee, such as a manufacturer. Compare VRR, supra note 25, art. 4(6), with 1996 TTR,
supra note 26, art. 1(1)(5).
63. See 2004 TTR, supra note 24.
64. See VRR, supra note 25, art. 2(3).
65. See Commission Notice, 2000 O.J. (C 291) 1 [hereinafter VRR Guidelines]; see also
VRR, supra note 25, recital (3).
66. 1996 TTR, supra note 26, art. 5.
67. VRR, supra note 25, arts. 2(3), (5).
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licenses that are intended for exploitation or manufacture by the
68
licensee.
Therefore, vertical agreements related to other intellectual property
rights are covered, provided that the license remains ancillary so as to
69
constitute a mere means to implement the contract for supply. Hence,
under Article 2(3) of the VRR, a contract for the supply of patented
70
goods for sale falls within the scope of the provisions. It also follows
that these criteria must apply in relation to all other forms of intellectual
property including, for example, copyright.
A different approach to concluding whether certain intellectual
property licenses in vertical agreements are covered by the VRR is to
analyze the relationship between Article 2(1), which refers to all vertical
agreements, and Article 2(3), which allows for the inclusion of ancillary
71
intellectual property rights. The main issue here is whether Article
2(3) excludes any other intellectual property agreements—that is, pure
licenses that are not ancillary, but also include the characteristics
72
mentioned in Article 2(1). One view is to permit certain intellectual
property-related contracts to fall within the ambit of Article 2(1), thus
73
invoking the application of the block exemption. The main concern
thereby being to address the absence of a group exemption, particularly
74
for franchising agreements and copyright licenses.
The contrary view, under which Article 2(3) is considered a lex
specialis to Article 2(1), would force the conclusion that intellectual
75
property licenses, as such, cannot be covered unless they are ancillary.
The solution to be found amongst these countervailing views is perhaps
found in considering that it is almost impossible to draw a distinction
between an ancillary and a non-ancillary provision relating to
intellectual property rights if one disregards the intention of the parties
and places emphasis instead solely on the fact that intellectual property
rights have been licensed. Under such an approach, a more balanced
view may be taken: the applicability of the VRR depends on the

68. KORAH, supra note 28, at 248.
69. See VRR Guidelines, supra note 65, at 9.
70. VRR, supra note 25, art. 2(3).
71. Id. arts. 2(1), (3).
72. Id.
73. Id.
74. VALENTINE KORAH & DENIS O’SULLIVAN, DISTRIBUTION AGREEMENTS UNDER
THE EC COMPETITION RULES 143 (2002).
75. Case 161/84, Pronuptia de Paris GmbH v. Pronuptia de Paris Irmgard Schillgallis,
1986 E.C.R. 353; see KORAH & O’SULLIVAN, supra note 74, at 143.
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proximity of a contract to a vertical supply agreement rather than to a
license. The TTR is, thus, lex specialis in relation to contracts regarding
technology transfers because such contracts require a more generous
scope of exemption. The scope of restrictions in relation to territory,
substance, and time exceed those of the VRR. Licenses relating to
other types of intellectual property, such as copyright, therefore, cannot
be exempt under the VRR if the licenses go beyond the scope of the
supply of other types of intellectual property, particularly if these
76
contracts relate to the manufacture of the protected product.
But even if Article 2(3) of the VRR is not interpreted so as to
restrict the entire scope of application to ancillary intellectual property
provisions, a more flexible approach considering the reasons why the
77
TTR does not apply to sole supply agreements still proves instructive.
The manufacturer must develop and invest in manufacturing devices.
This investment makes it more difficult to penetrate the market. In
addition, because the TTR generally relates to new technology, it is
78
more difficult for licensees to acquire a market altogether.
The
licensees not only have to bear investment costs, but also higher risks—
both risks that are normally not present in agreements relating to supply
and resale. For these agreements, however, the licensees and licensors
can agree on rather extensive protectionist terms.
In relation to copyrighted software, for example, it is suggested that
a licensing agreement pertaining to distribution can be exempt under
the VRR if the software license relates primarily to distribution of the
physical software. The licensee—for instance, a wholesaler—may then
need a simple license to run the program based upon the right to
temporarily make a reproduction in accordance with Article 4(a) of the
79
European Software Directive. Hence, a distribution agreement that
entails the right of the licensee to adapt or develop the software can fall
under the VRR because the reproduction right granted has no
80
individual economic significance in relation to the distribution. The
same may be true in relation to contracts regarding the subsequent
81
update of databases by licensees. Because the 2004 TTR now allows

76. See 2004 TTR, supra note 24; VRR; supra note 25.
77. See 1996 TTR, supra note 26, art. 10(15) (defining “ancillary provisions” as related
to exploitation).
78. See id.
79. See Council Directive 91/250, 1991 O.J. (L 122) 42.
80. See id.
81. See id.
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82

for the inclusion of software copyrights but not database copyrights or
83
rights subsisting under Article 7 of the European Software Directive,
the final categorization of such contracts remains dubious and adds to
the legal uncertainty regarding technology-related copyrights.
Applying a more restrictive reading of the term “ancillary,” a
different result will follow in relation to trademark licenses for
franchising purposes. If a franchisee does not have to bear substantial
investment costs due to an established market reputation for the goods
or services protected by the mark, one may deduce that the agreement
is being concluded in relation to an existing market. Here, the transfer
of trademarks is a more substantial component of the agreement
because without the established reputation, the parties would not have
entered into the agreement. Consequently, the trademark does not
constitute an ancillary right, but rather is the very primary object. This
may transpire entirely differently in relation to registered marks, which
have not yet acquired market reputation. In short, the importance of
reputation, as reflected in the respective trademark, will determine
84
whether the VRR applies.
The 2004 TTR strictly adheres to market shares rather than relying
85
on licensing clauses.
An important distinction is made between
competing and noncompeting undertakings. In general, the TTR
applies to competing undertakings if the combined market share does
not exceed twenty percent of the relevant technology and product
market; in the case of noncompeting undertakings, the threshold has
86
been set at thirty percent. In effect, this approach forces a significant
number of major undertakings back into the realm of Article 81(1) EC
and will also affect small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs), which
87
rely heavily upon the production of specialized products.
The

82. See 2004 TTR, supra note 24.
83. See Council Directive 91/250, supra note 79, art. 7.
84. See generally VRR, supra note 25.
85. See 2004 TTR, supra note 24.
86. See id. art. 3.
For technology transfer agreements between non-competitors it can be presumed
that, where the individual share of the relevant markets accounted for by each of the
parties does not exceed 30% and the agreements do not contain certain severely
anti-competitive restraints, they generally lead to an improvement in production or
distribution and allow consumers a fair share of the resulting benefits.
Id. recital (11).
87. See EC Treaty art. 81(1). It has already been argued that the “market share”
approach—rather than an approach based on substantive terms—is counterproductive
because industries relying on innovation will, to a large extent, be above the market share
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combination of factual restrictions and the additional application of the
provisions on the free movement of goods will, thus, produce an
understanding of the exhaustion rhetoric that is directly applicable to
further sales and supports a general understanding of the exhaustion
principle as a formula for shaping and adjusting national intellectual
property rights. There will be grave effects: even if territorial
restrictions are permissive and are perceived to be pro-competitive
because they allow for recoupment of investment costs, the violation of
such clauses by a licensee or buyer will only constitute a breach of
contract.
Such a position, however, is fallacious and factually
contravenes the potentially pro-competitive effect of both technology
transfer licenses and also certain other types of vertical restraints. A
licensee may be so attracted by actual price differences that he or she
would undertake the economic risk of contractual damages in return for
a higher profit by selling into reserved territories—such a scenario is not
unlikely, especially in the pharmaceuticals sector where price fixation
88
exists. It also, once again, gives rise to a high level of legal uncertainty.
If an owner of an intellectual property right may restrict distribution
as a matter of European Community law, a considerable difficulty arises
in relation to determining the status of such restrictions as either
absolute or contractual. This issue is fundamentally identical to that
which would arise under national intellectual property laws; national
systems still have to employ some form of proportionality test for
ensuring the free circulation of goods, and yet this must be balanced
against the respective domestic notions of intellectual property and the
proprietary effects of restrictive clauses. This implies that jurisdictions
may differ in respect to the effect of a licensor’s consent, which may or
may not have an absolute effect, and, additionally, may also invoke a
notion of national market freedom under which the impact of
permissible restrictions on the free circulation of protected products
may be curtailed. One consequence of a more open system of
restraints—territorial or otherwise—is that, because market partitioning
is acceptable from a European Community law perspective, the extent
because there are no real substitutes. In addition, if the VRR applies to other forms of
intellectual property rights as “ancillary”—for instance, database rights—a divergent
treatment of the exhaustion rule will cause concern because it differentiates on the basis of an
artificial discrimination regarding subject matter. The problem has also surfaced in relation
to franchising agreements, which predominantly rely upon trademark use, causing
uncertainties as to whether such intellectual property rights are “ancillary.”
88. See, e.g., Pharmalicensing.com: EMEA and the Marketing of Pharmaceuticals
Across the European Union, http://pharmalicensing.com/articles/disp/994346010_3b448
41a653f7 (last visited Apr. 10, 2007).

WESTKAMP ARTICLE

2007]

THE EUROPEAN EXHAUSTION DOCTRINE

307

to which restrictive licensing clauses are permissible becomes a matter
of national law.
In regard to the issue of consent, neither the jurisprudence under
Article 28 EC nor the respective block exemptions disclose whether a
89
permissible but limited consent has absolute effect.
This is
unsurprising as both legal frameworks deal with potential distortions of
the common market rather than establishing directly applicable norms
for a scheme of European intellectual property licensing laws.
Otherwise, the effect of permissible restrictions will become a matter of
national law. It then becomes primarily an issue of controlling both
distribution channels and market levels, and this, in turn, depends on
the scope of contractual freedom to allow the licensor to restrict
subsequent sales into reserved territories with proprietary effect.
According to the jurisprudence of the ECJ, such freedom does not
exist because the European exhaustion rule does not pertain to the
“first sale,” but rather pertains to any prospect of recouping an
90
investment. This approach is based upon the reward theory, according
to which even an acceptable territorial restriction does not protect
against parallel imports.
However, this inference is hardly
ascertainable. It would, as a de minimis principle, axiomatically require
the existence of a European exhaustion rule as a matter of intellectual
property law, unequivocally demarcating the scope of contractual
freedom under national law.
B. The Twofold Meaning of Consent
Thus, the first conclusion relates to the interface between
permissible restraints and proprietary consent.
Under both the
jurisprudence on Articles 81(1) and 28 EC and the respective secondary
legislation, “consent” refers to the act of putting products on the
91
market.
But the scope of that rule remains rather imprecise.
Territorial restrictions based on the differences between national
intellectual property systems were perceived as distorting the common
92
market. For this reason, the ECJ has used the exhaustion rule so as to
restrict control over subsequent sales on the basis of the act of

89. See EC Treaty art. 28; 2004 TTR, supra note 24; VRR, supra note 25.
90. Case 19/84, Pharmon BV v. Hoechst AG, 1985 E.C.R. 2281; Case 16/74, Centrafarm
BV v. Winthrop BV, 1974 E.C.R. 1183.
91. See EC Treaty arts. 28, 81(1).
92. See Pharmon, 1985 E.C.R. 2281.
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licensing. Such an approach appeared legitimate in that the level of
integration was rather undeveloped. Early on, the ECJ emphasized that
consent was the cornerstone of its exhaustion concept, and it declined to
recognize the occurrence of exhaustion in cases concerning non94
voluntary acts of distribution or in cases in which the goods were
95
placed on the market outside the European Community.
Whereas the meaning of consent under most national laws related to
putting products on the market, the ECJ operated with the
96
understanding that any consent was sufficient.
It referred to the
specific subject matter of the intellectual property right in the context of
Article 30 EC and concluded that the specific subject matter referred to
97
the right of putting the product into circulation for the first time. Such
an act would then exhaust the right with effect for the entire European
Community. It, thus, became irrelevant whether the agreement
contained anti-competitive restrictions because it would be captured
under Article 28 EC, which would necessarily supersede any right to
98
The key to this analysis is the emphasis
prevent parallel imports.
placed on “consent,” which the ECJ interpreted so as to refer to the
entire territory of the EC Treaty and which it equated with entering into
99
licensing agreements, including compulsory licenses. This allowed for
a step back from the more restrictive requirements under Article 81 EC
and also invoked a legal rule under which entering into a license
agreement, as such, was sufficient.
In turn, this interpretation
developed into the understanding that every act of putting a product
93. See id.
94. Id.
95. See Case C-355/96, Silhouette Int’l Schmied GmbH & Co. KG v. Hartlauer
Handelsgesellschaft mbH, 1998 E.C.R. I-4799.
96. See sources cited supra note 23.
97. See Joined Cases 55 & 57/80, Musik-Vertrieb Membran GmbH v. GEMA, 1981
E.C.R. 147.
98. See EC Treaty art. 28.
99. See Joined Cases C-267 & 268/95, Merck & Co. v. Primecrown Ltd., 1996 E.C.R. I6285 (stating that the substance of a patent right was the exclusive right to put the invention
on the market for the first time); Case 144/81, Keurkoop BV v. Nancy Kean Gifts BV, 1982
E.C.R. 2853; Case 187/80, Merck & Co. v. Stephar BV, 1981 E.C.R. 2063 (stating that patent
law does not give a right to monopoly profits and a patentee cannot prevent reimportation of
goods previously marketed in another Member State even though the invention was not
patentable there); Musik-Vertrieb, 1981 E.C.R. 147 (holding that there is no right to
additional royalties for a copyright collecting society); Case 15/74, Centrafarm BV v. Sterling
Drug Inc., 1974 E.C.R. 1147 (addressing the right to first put into circulation, either directly
or by an authorized party, and the right to sue for infringement); see also Robert M. Merkin,
The Interface Between Anti-Trust and Intellectual Property, 6 EUR. COMPETITION L. REV.
377, 391 (1985).
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into circulation resulted in exhaustion, even when the place of first
circulation was a country in which no rights existed or where the owner
could not be rewarded, a scenario which was held to result in rendering
100
intellectual property rights a nudum ius.
Territorial restrictions in licensing contracts cannot affect the
occurrence of exhaustion as a matter of the proprietary scope of
intellectual property rights.
Such an understanding, however,
presupposes that the ECJ’s jurisprudence has established a true
limitation on the exercise of national intellectual property rights.
Consent, in this respect, was not employed as a predeterminative,
normative rule, but rather constituted the principle aspect for resolving
and guiding the proportionality test—mostly, but not necessarily, in
101
favor of free circulation. If this is correct, the status of consent—and,
subsequently, its effects upon exhaustion—may be analyzed more
closely in light of the function of intellectual property rights and, more
specifically, the scope of the licensor’s ability to bind his or her buyers
and licensees.
The current trend is to allow restraints for non-dominant firms. This
is true, at least, with respect to technology transfer rules and also under
102
Article 81(1) EC. This appears to introduce a more flexible notion of
consent in that the owner of intellectual property rights is permitted to
restrict subsequent sales and may stipulate certain substantive
103
restrictions.
Therefore, the view may be taken that the meaning of
consent as a matter of European Community law is identical to the
scope of the license. Hence, a license restricting the ability of the
licensee to sell into reserved territories would not additionally be
104
subject to a compatibility test under Article 30 EC.
The licensor
would be able to prevent exhaustion as a matter of his or her restricted
consent, provided that the clause is exempt. Here, the only problem is
that the block exemptions do not contain express provisions on

100. See Clifford G. Miller, Magill: Time to Abandon the “Specific Subject-Matter”
Concept, 16 EUR. INTELL. PROP. REV. 415, 419 (1994).
101. The arguments raised in relation to a self-induced liability of the licensor by
putting goods on the market are unconvincing because Article 30 EC relates to the restrictive
practices under national law and is unconcerned with an individual’s behavior. See, e.g.,
Merck, 1981 E.C.R. 2063; see also Folkmar Koenigs, Rechtsfolgen der Einheitlichen
Europäischen Akte für den Gewerblichen Rechtsschutz, in LOHN DER LEISTUNG UND
RECHTSSICHERHEIT 267 (Manfred Bohlig ed., 1988).
102. Commission Decision 95/373, 1995 O.J. (L 221) 34.
103. Id.
104. See id.
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exhaustion; following a more conventional approach, that might cause
105
disparities insofar as the type of agreement is concerned.
The same is true for most national intellectual property systems,
which allow for restrictions unless they exceed the scope of intellectual
property rights granted as a matter of competition law. Under
European Community law, the issue of exhaustion is, therefore,
undecided insofar as the block exemptions vary in their scope of
application and their respective stances on exhaustion in cases of
territorial restrictions.
C. Territorial Restrictions as Sector-Specific Exemptions on Exhaustion?
As previously noted, Article 2(1)(14) of the 1996 TTR maintains the
right of a patentee to oppose exploitation outside the licensed
106
territory.
The provision is interpreted so as to simultaneously imply
107
that exhaustion does not occur.
Territorial restrictions will then
enable the licensor to bind third parties because the necessary consent is
absent—that is, they will have an absolute effect. As a matter of law,
such restrictions would also, therefore, not violate Article 28 EC.
Conversely, in Europe, the exhaustion rule would generally apply
under Article 28 EC with direct effect upon national intellectual
property rights; in that sense, it has proprietary effect. It follows that
the effect rests in restricting the scope of intellectual property rights in
order to generally exclude any further control over subsequent sales.
Such a position rests upon the traditional perception of intellectual
property licenses as obstacles for establishing the common market;
given this perception, the ECJ has exhibited subsequent hostility toward
territorial restrictions.
1. Market Freedom and Differentiation of Market Levels
108

Under the former Patent Licensing Regulation, the view was taken
that the first act of licensing exhausts the right with effect for the entire
109
territory. If it were to apply to subsequent acts, the owner would be
able to control subsequent sales and impose diverging levels of
110
protection.
If it applied at the stage where the licensed product
105.
106.
107.
108.
109.
110.

See supra Part II.A.
1996 TTR, supra note 26, art. 2(1)(14).
Id.
Commission Regulation 2349/84, supra note 49.
See id.
James S. Venit, In the Wake of Windsurfing: Patent Licensing in the Common
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reaches the consumer, then sales prior to this could be controlled by
way of national patent laws. It should be noted, however, that a striking
distinction exists in European case law that appears to apply to the
entirety of intellectual property rights—that is, the right to control all
sales. Under national patent and copyright laws, exhaustion occurs only
once the product or copy has actually been put into circulation, and the
effect only applies to these specific copies; under European Community
laws, exhaustion occurs without any objective circulation at the time at
111
which the contract is entered.
This stance is, thus, much more
restrictive, and it is suggested that the rigidity imposed by the ECJ
112
reiterates the correctness of the functional approach.
In fact, by
insisting on exhaustion through the act of licensing, the ECJ has
adopted a view that is hardly reconcilable with the function of the
exhaustion rule under national law. Thus, it remains a basic blueprint
that serves to achieve a balance between the core, untouchable subject
matter and the consequences of exercising intellectual property rights in
relation to the common market. Consequentially, if the exhaustion rule
simply exists as a collision clause, its impact will be a matter of the
applicable national laws in relation to the licensing contract.
2. Potential Disparities Between Block Exemptions
The second problem this will induce is a potentially artificial
exemption from exhaustion under different block exemptions. Hence,
exhaustion can only be prevented under the TTR as a sector-specific
exception in expressly referring to a continued sole exploitation right in
113
reserved territories, but not, hypothetically, under the VRR.
The exhaustion rule, therefore, will apply since the clause effects a
barrier to trade within the meaning of Article 28 EC if the licensor
114
evokes his or her rights in order to introduce export bans. In such a
case, there is no opportunity to invoke national patent rights to stop
115
direct sales. This was the position set forth under the Patent Licensing

Market, in 1986 FORDHAM CORPORATE LAW INSTITUTE 517, 528–29 (B. Hawk ed., 1987).
111. See Case 19/84, Pharmon BV v. Hoechst AG, 1985 E.C.R. 2281.
112. Id.
113. See 2004 TTR, supra note 24; VRR, supra note 25.
114. Case 258/78, Nungesser KG v. Comm’n, 1982 E.C.R. 2015.
115. Cf. ANDERMAN, supra note 28, at 98 (stating that even though a clause may be
caught under Article 81(1) EC, the licensor may still be able to rely on national patent rights).
The correct view is to treat the agreement in accordance with Article 81(1) EC, whereas the
question of exhaustion in cases of illegitimate restrictions—for example, an export ban
imposed between individual licensees—should be treated under Articles 28 through 30 EC.
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Regulation, under which a territorial restriction would have no effect on
116
in other words, the
subsequent sales into reserved territories;
contractual clause—albeit, enforceable against the licensee—had no
absolute proprietary effect.
As previously noted, this appears to have changed under the 1996
TTR, where Article 2(1)(14) upheld the licensors’ right to oppose
117
subsequent sales within reserved territories with absolute effect,
118
The
although the TTR does not mention the exhaustion principle.
2004 TTR, likewise, does not mention exhaustion, but it does permit any
territorial restriction provided that the market thresholds are not
119
exceeded.
If the view were to be taken that the respective block
exemptions deal with the exhaustion issue, this would have a number of
consequences. First, exhaustion would be a result of the applicability of
either the TTR or VRR. The consequences now are apparently less
grave than they would have been under the 1996 TTR, which prohibited
120
restrictions on sales into territories reserved to other licensees; the
121
Hence, in
VRR now allows such territorial protection for buyers.
cases of mixed supply and licensing agreement structures, if a buyer sold
in a licensee’s territory, the owner of the intellectual property right
would not be able to prevent further sales because Article 2(1)(14) of
the 1996 TTR would be inapplicable in prohibiting such territorial
122
protections.
Therefore, exhaustion would have occurred once the
goods had been supplied from the country of export, and the clause
123
would be captured under Article 81(1) EC.
If he or she sold into
another buyer’s territory, such territorial protection would be
permissive under the VRR provided that the intellectual property right
in question is ‘ancillary’ to the main contract; however, because the
clause is exempt under the VRR—which includes no provision similar
to Article 2(1)(14) of the 1996 TTR—the general rules of exhaustion
would apply. This leads to a potential inconsistency between both the
provisions of the TTR and VRR.

116. See ANDERMAN, supra note 28, at 97; Venit, supra note 110, at 527.
117. See ANDERMAN, supra note 28, at 99; KORAH, supra note 28, at 298.
118. See 1996 TTR, supra note 26, art. 2(1)(14).
119. See TTR 2004, supra note 24, art. 4.
120. See 1996 TTR, supra note 26.
121. See VRR, supra note 25, recital (3).
122. As has been discussed, Article 2(1)(14) of the 1996 TTR only allowed a reservation
of the licensor of his or her right conferred by a patent to oppose the exploitation by a
licensee, not by a buyer of a protected product. 1996 TTR, supra note 26, art. 2(1)(14).
123. See EC Treaty art. 81(1).

WESTKAMP ARTICLE

2007]

THE EUROPEAN EXHAUSTION DOCTRINE

313

Territorial restrictions within the ambit of the TTR would, therefore,
prevent exhaustion between licensors and licensees, which implies that
third parties may be bound under the terms of contracts based on
domestic intellectual property rights. It is obvious that a licensee cannot
reimport into a licensor’s territory; the ensuing question, however, is
whether or not the licensor can also prevent further sales by third
parties. This depends on whether the respective clause is proprietary—
that is, whether the control right over subsequent acts of distribution
124
can be enforced on the basis of national intellectual property rights.
If the TTR permits reservations of territories, subsequent acts of
distribution at different market levels might violate Article 28 EC,
despite being exempt from competition control.
The answer
predominantly depends upon the relationship between Articles 81 and
28 EC and the status of the exhaustion rule under the principle of the
125
free movement of goods. If Articles 81 and 28 EC are complementary
in seeking to ensure a balance between pro-competitive restrictions and
the free movement of goods, one may conclude either that Article 28
126
EC is inapplicable or that the restriction can be justified under Article
30 EC, precisely because it aims to uphold the effect of intellectual
property rights as an incentive.
In its traditional judicature, the ECJ has consistently determined to
127
permit the inventor the chance of reward, rather than gain a true
128
profit; such a position, however, was informed by the “first licensing”
doctrine, which necessarily rendered both concepts consistent in
prohibiting territorial restraints. Whether the TTR allows for the
inference that European Community law may now be interpreted more
extensively as enabling the licensor to recoup reward beyond the mere
129
act of licensing is an open question. A view rejecting the notion of a
124. See ANDERMAN, supra note 28, at 98.
125. See infra Part III.A.
126. See infra Part IV.A.
127. Case 15/74, Centrafarm BV v. Sterling Drug Inc., 1974 E.C.R. 1147.
128. See Case 187/80, Merck & Co. v. Stephar BV, 1981 E.C.R. 2063 (applying
exhaustion even regardless of a factual chance of reward); Centrafarm, 1974 E.C.R. 1147; see
also JÖRG REINBOTHE & SILKE VON LEWINSKI, THE EC DIRECTIVE ON RENTAL AND
LENDING RIGHTS AND ON PIRACY 17 (1993) (asserting that consent refers to putting the
work on the market for the first time).
129. Case 19/84, Pharmon BV v. Hoechst AG, 1985 E.C.R. 2281 (suggesting that in
cases of direct sales, exhaustion should apply, thereby favoring free circulation of goods over
territorial restrictions); see also Case 78/70, Deutsche Grammophon Gesellschaft mbH v.
Metro-SB-Großmärkte GmbH & Co. KG, 1971 E.C.R. 487 (applying a similar result to
copyright).
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European license as a matter of competition policy would signify that
the TTR embraces a proprietary concept, allowing for inferences to be
drawn as to the scope of intellectual property rights.
Therefore, it appears that exhaustion does not occur, at least as far
as European Community law is concerned with regard to clauses falling
within the TTR. In general, this viewpoint is difficult to reconcile with
the conceptual framework and interface between competition law and
the rules related to the free movement of goods. Within national legal
frameworks, competition law is concerned with restrictions stemming
from intellectual property monopolies. The normative assertion of
competition law is not concerned with providing rules of a proprietary
character. Initially, it cannot be asserted whether exhaustion occurs as a
matter of European Community competition law. In addition, such an
interpretation would give rise to uncertainties because it would depend
on whether the applicable block exemption contained a provision
expressly allowing for a territorial restriction as a matter of copyright or
patent law, which would restrict the proprietary nature of territorial
restrictions to those block exemptions primarily concerned with
intellectual property licenses.
Restrictions falling within the VRR, then, ostensibly do not give rise
to exhaustion and might be included under Article 28 EC. But, here, it
remains open to consideration as to the following: (1) at which market
level exhaustion will occur, and (2) whether the supplier of protected
goods can still control further sales on the basis of national intellectual
property rights. The prior jurisprudence of the ECJ is unhelpful; in
most cases the ECJ held that initial consent was decisive, but the
relevant case law did not deal with a situation in which an intellectual
property right ancillary to a distribution agreement was invoked so as to
prevent further sales. For licenses not covered by a block exemption
but exempt under Article 81(1) EC, the same would presumably apply.
On the other hand, it is apparent that the notion of exhaustion and
its doctrinal foundation as a matter of market freedom remains
pertinent, but the extent to which it affects licenses is now debatable.
This is because its doctrinal status is unclear. There are principally two
positions taken up in approaching this debate. First, one may take the
view that the principle of free movement of goods is still intact, and,

130. Commission Decision 95/373, supra note 102; see Joined Cases 55 & 57/80, MusikVertrieb Membran GmbH v. GEMA, 1981 E.C.R. 147 (suggesting that the ability to exploit
was a precondition for exhaustion); see also Case T-504/93, Tiercé Ladbroke v. Comm’n, 1997
E.C.R. II-923.
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therefore, the scope of licenses and their ability to bind third parties is
irrelevant. This first view is based upon earlier jurisprudence, but
presumes that a European exhaustion rule truly exists as a matter of
intellectual property law. This position will be analyzed and ultimately
rejected in Part III. The second view is to identify parameters to restrict
the exercise of intellectual property rights, rather than as a matter of
overcoming territorial restrictions. As will be discussed, this causes a
number of problems due to the differences among national intellectual
property laws in regard to the more delicate issues of divisibility of
131
economic rights and the character of licenses as being proprietary.
III. THE MYTH OF EUROPEAN EXHAUSTION: THE DOCTRINAL
STATUS OF ARTICLE 30 EC IN COMPETITION LAW
In permitting territorial restraints as a matter of European
Community competition law, the question, thus, arises as to the
underlying rationale and continued applicability and potential of the
exhaustion principle. The central issue is whether the exhaustion rule
has binding effect in that, on the basis of the overriding free movement
of goods principle, it eradicates restrictions in licensing agreements that
permit some territorial protection. One way to address the issue is to
consider the status of the exhaustion rule as part of national intellectual
property laws implemented as a consequence of European Community
legislation; here, in particular, the arguments may be raised in relation
to exhaustion with respect to cases of online uses.
Currently, the statutory regulation of distribution systems of
protected articles is tripartite. Regulation of distribution systems is
permissible under the relevant block exemptions, but the question has
arisen as to whether the VRR and TTR deal with exhaustion in
different ways. Such an approach should be rejected because it would
result in a divergent treatment of the exhaustion principle and would
cause legal uncertainty. It is submitted, therefore, that the correct view
is to treat the exhaustion question, not as an issue exclusively resolved
under the provisions of the TTR, but as a more fundamental issue of
proportionality. The correct interpretation of Article 2(1)(14) of the
1996 TTR and its successor, therefore, is that it merely deals with the
validity of a contractual restriction rather than conferring powers on the
basis of national intellectual property rights. This perception, as such,
permits a more functional approach to the relationship between

131. See infra Part IV.A.
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competition law and market freedom, and it need not be restricted to
territorial restraints.
Thus, the issue of exhaustion turns in to the issue of the binding
effect of that jurisprudence on national intellectual property rights.
Here, the second and third regulatory layers need to be analyzed. This
pertains to the dogmatic status of the exhaustion rule under Article 30
EC, which leads to the more general issue of the interface of
competition rules and the free movement of goods.
A. Construction of Intellectual Property Under Article 30 EC: A Matter
of Intellectual Property Regulation?
There is ample evidence to suggest that the interpretation of the
principle of the free movement of goods, as applied to the exercise of
intellectual property rights, is not concerned with a proprietary notion
but is exclusively informed by the need to reconcile the conflict between
territoriality and market freedom.
Under a more functional approach, the argument that exhaustion
cannot occur within the context of Articles 28 through 30 EC may be
based on the view that both provisions on competition control and the
free movement of goods are complementary in the sense that both sets
of rules exist to achieve the goal of a common market, as set forth in
132
Article 2 EC. Article 30 EC then primarily serves as a collision clause
133
applied flexibly.
This view develops from the cumulation theory, as
applied with respect to the interface between competition and market
freedom rules. Accordingly, contractual territorial restrictions violate
Article 28 EC only insofar as they constitute a discriminatory
134
restriction.
In that sense, Article 30 EC establishes a general collision clause
between a justifiable and a non-justifiable exercise of intellectual
property rights. Thus, the exhaustion rule is merely an instrument to
achieve a result that would otherwise provoke a separation of the
132. See Deutsche Grammophon, 1971 E.C.R. 487; Case 24/67, Parke, Davis & Co. v.
Probel, 1968 E.C.R. 55; Joined Cases 56 & 58/64, Etablissements Consten, S.A.R.L. v.
Comm’n, 1966 E.C.R. 299. Some commentators have suggested that permitted licensing
clauses under Article 81(3) EC should not additionally be subjected to Articles 28 through 30
EC. See LAURENCE W. GORMLEY, PROHIBITING RESTRICTIONS ON TRADE WITHIN THE
EEC 20–21, 285 (1985); Martin Schödermeier, Die Ernte der “Maissaaat”: Einige
Anmerkungen zum Verhältnis von Art. 30 und 85 EWG-Vertrag, 1987 GEWERBLICHER
RECHTSSCHUTZ UND URHEBERRECHT INTERNATIONALER [GRUR INT.] 85.
133. See EC Treaty art. 30.
134. See id. art. 28.
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internal market. It can be used to overcome the fact that the EC Treaty
does not affect the property rights guaranteed by the national legislation
135
of Member States. In that sense, it provides a line of argument based
on a comparison between national laws and serves as a watershed by
invoking the specific subject matter test, a test primarily used to
overcome the intricacies of the territoriality principle in relation to the
grant of a patent. This view is, for instance, supported by the rhetoric
that the ECJ used in trademark cases. In cases concerning the
repackaging of goods protected by trademarks, the ECJ has emphasized
the potentially pro-competitive effects of prohibitions on resales
because the act of repackaging conflicts with the original function of a
136
trademark.
The ECJ, thereby, refers to the function of intellectual
property rights in specific circumstances, which allows the trademark
137
owner to oppose parallel imports. In the context of its Article 30 EC
analysis, the ECJ has established reasons for a justification of
prohibitions on parallel imports and, thus, deviates from its own
exhaustion jurisprudence.
The resulting jurisprudence created a need for a line of argument to
allow for sound statutory interpretation and to lend doctrinal credibility
to the existing reasoning promulgating the principle of free movement
of goods. Article 30 EC expressly provides a justification on the basis of
138
safeguarding national industrial property rights.
The exhaustion

135. Id. art. 222.
136. In relation to trademarks, the ECJ has developed the concept of the essential
function, which subsequently found its way into the Trade Mark Regulation. See Case C273/00, Sieckmann v. Deutsches Patent, 2002 E.C.R. I-11737 (stating that “the essential
function of a trade mark is to guarantee the identity of the origin of the marked product or
service to the consumer or end-user by enabling him . . . to distinguish that product or service
from others”). Article 7 of the Trade Marks Approximation Directive establishes the
principle of “exhaustion of the rights conferred by a trade mark.” Council Directive 89/104,
art. 7, 1989 O.J. (L 40) 1.
1. The trade mark shall not entitle the proprietor to prohibit its use in relation to
goods which have been put on the market in the Community under that trade mark
by the proprietor or with his consent.
2. Paragraph 1 shall not apply where there exist legitimate reasons for the
proprietor to oppose further commercialization of the goods, especially where the
condition of the goods is changed or impaired after they have been put on the
market.
Id.
137. Franz Christof Urlesberger, “Legitimate Reasons” for the Proprietor of a Trade
Mark Registered in the EU to Oppose Further Dealings in the Goods After They Have Been
Put on the Market for the First Time, 36 COMMON MKT. L. REV. 1195 (1999).
138. EC Treaty art. 30.
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principle, as established in national laws related to distribution rights,
provided a welcome device to inform the analysis as it existed in most
Member States, and, in turn, it allowed for judicature based upon a
comparative analysis of intellectual property laws combined with the
aim of abolishing national boundaries. This was first based upon the
existence and exercise dichotomy and later on the specific subject
matter test. Both tests were necessary as normative elements under
Article 30 EC. It also enabled the ECJ to overcome arguments
purporting a cumulative application of the rules on restrictive practices
contravening Article 81 EC and the rules on the free movement of
139
goods.
Under the cumulation theory, the ECJ would have had to prove a
disguised restriction or discrimination, largely enabling parallel imports.
National intellectual property rights can be exercised without such
140
consequences under Article 81 EC, and it would have forced the ECJ
141
to rely upon the more restrictive provisions of Article 81 EC. Hence,
the exhaustion rule, as applied in the context of Article 30 EC, is one—
albeit decisive—element in the balancing of interests analysis, but it is
not a jurisprudential limitation on property rights as such. The
subsequent formulation of a specific subject matter test serves as a
device to channel the legal rhetoric into a sound and flexible balancing
of interests. This approach reveals the dogmatic function of Article 30
EC as a collision clause when applied to conflicts between territorial
intellectual property rights and market freedom. This test was informed
by the almost unanimous will to give preference to market freedom,
which is clearly evident in decisions focusing on actual—and later,
hypothetical—reward and the subsequent reliance upon the sheer act of
placing goods in the market. These arguments, albeit clad in a rhetoric
pertaining to the subject matter of an intellectual property right,
primarily reflect policy driven arguments and explain the shift toward
emphasizing the consent issue as a decisive element for limiting the
exercise of distribution rights.
It follows that the status of intellectual property exhaustion is
undecided in regard to permissible restrictions. Thereby, the influence
of Article 30 EC on national intellectual property rights appears
extremely limited. The inference of a Community-wide exhaustion

139. See Case 15/74, Centrafarm BV v. Sterling Drug Inc., 1974 E.C.R. 1147.
140. F.A. Mann, Industrial Property and the E.E.C.Treaty, 24 INT’L & COMP. L.Q. 31, 34
(1975).
141. See GORMLEY, supra note 132, at 233; Beier, supra note 13.
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“principle” is workable as long as it can be dovetailed with a general
perception that the exercise of intellectual property rights as a means to
redraw national boundaries is inconsistent with the common market
aim; further, it should apply only to the extent that rules regarding
restrictive licensing clauses are perceived as cumulatively violating the
142
competition and free movement of goods provisions.
B. Implemented European Intellectual Property Regulation: The
Applicability of Article 28 EC and Permissible Restraints
Secondary legislation in Europe has been heavily influenced by the
jurisprudence on exhaustion, and this has certainly led to an
understanding of the exhaustion rule as a core principle of harmonized
intellectual property law. In the case of implemented exhaustion rules,
Member States are required to interpret such norms in accordance with
European Community legislation.
One interpretation is that a
transposed exhaustion rule has enshrined the European first sale
doctrine as a proprietary limitation on the distribution right. Such a
reading has the effect of suggesting that exhaustion occurs, not as a
matter of the overriding principle of free movement of goods, but as a
limitation of national rights. Permissible restrictions would be a matter
of competition law only, and their effect would certainly not be absolute
so as to enable further control over subsequent market levels.
However, a closer look at national systems reveals that such an
interpretation is unsound. Although it is clear that exhaustion occurs at
the point where goods reach the consumer market, national laws still
have discrepancies in relation to the scope of control and the question of
143
whether such control can bind third parties. This problem has never
been addressed precisely because the European Commission relies upon
a seemingly rigid manifestation of the traditional ECJ jurisprudence.
The effect is that (1) restrictions that allow such control necessarily go
beyond the scope of the limited intellectual property; (2) such clauses
prima facie violate competition law and may only be exceptionally
exempt; and (3) regardless of the permissibility of the clause, the free
movement principle will supersede—that is, there is no allowance for a
142. This is because a violation of Article 81 EC would, according to the jurisprudence
of the ECJ, simultaneously violate Article 28 EC. Joined Cases 56 & 58/64, Etablissements
Consten, S.A.R.L. v. Comm’n, 1966 E.C.R. 299. The ECJ held that Article 30 EC cannot
restrict the application of Article 81 EC. Id. Subsequently, the ECJ emphasized that Article
30 EC was applicable by way of analogy, but it referred to the occurrence of exhaustion. See
Case 24/67, Parke, Davis & Co. v. Probel, 1968 E.C.R. 55, 61.
143. See infra Part IV.
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cumulative and dovetailed application of both sets of rules. In short,
arguments based on a dynamic balancing of interests are foreclosed.
One revelation of this position is that it consistently equates acts of
distribution with physical goods. The questionability of this position
becomes apparent in a different context: the relationship of the free
movement of goods and the free provision of services. The main issue
regarding the exhaustion principle is whether the jurisprudence, beyond
the treatment of the territoriality aspects, can be interpreted at all to
evoke an understanding of efforts to harmonize intellectual property
rights. This issue has arisen with respect to the scope of exhaustion in
relation to certain online uses. The European Commission has referred
to the jurisprudence under Article 28 EC and concluded that, because
144
online services do not constitutes goods but rather services, exhaustion
145
The distinction between goods and services used to
cannot occur.
justify this conclusion remains unclear; simply, European economies
experience an increasing overlap between the second and third sector.
The ECJ showed clearly that mutual exclusivity was not warranted, but
it was prepared to test a violation against both fundamental principles in
146
a case concerning television advertisements targeted at children.
In
147
short, the ECJ applied a discreet proportionality test. In conclusion,
very little of the ECJ’s judicature allows for an argument based upon
the exclusion of exhaustion. Practically, this may allow for an enlarged
scope for national laws to invoke the exhaustion principle, but it
certainly casts doubt upon the availability of invoking a general
exhaustion rule under Article 28 EC.
The reason for this exclusion is threefold. The first is closely
intertwined with the structure of Article 49 EC and the preceding
provisions dealing with the freedom to provide services as compared to
Article 28 EC. Article 49 EC does not contain a provision allowing for

144. This notion may also be inferred from the Directive on Electronic Commerce,
which refers to services as a matter of regulating online services. See Council Directive
2000/31, 2000 O.J. (L 178) 1.
145. Id.
146. Joined Cases C-34, 35 & 36/95, Konsumentombudsmannen v. De Agostini
(Svenska) Förlag AB, 1997 E.C.R. I-3843. The goods to be marketed were collectable parts
for a children’s reference book on dinosaurs produced by an Italian manufacturer. The
advertisements were broadcast from the United Kingdom into, inter alia, Sweden, where
media law prohibits advertisements targeted at children. Although the impact of the
prohibition was assessed in relation to both fundamental principles, the justification of the
Swedish media law provision was not addressed apart from the provisions of Articles 28
through 30 EC and Article 49 EC. See id.
147. See supra note 146.

WESTKAMP ARTICLE

2007]

THE EUROPEAN EXHAUSTION DOCTRINE

321

148

a justification. Compared to Article 30 EC, the missing link is that the
149
escape route toward a proportionality test is absent. This means that
the absence of an applicable exhaustion rule as an element allowing the
ECJ to strike a balance—or indeed to invoke other principles, which
may operate to restrict national intellectual property rights—is not
150
open.
Even if the systematic escape route under Article 30 EC is
obstructed because Article 28 EC does not apply, the ECJ has already
clarified that the freedom to provide services does not apply without
151
any restriction. Rather, it has upheld that national restrictions, which
are proportional, can justify a derogation from Article 49 EC, which, in
truth, reveals an application of a proportionality test by way of analogy
to Article 30 EC. Expressly, these include the protection of intellectual
152
property.
Hence, based on current judicature, one may assert that
Article 49 EC may, indeed, be limited by the application of inherent
intellectual property restrictions, which might as well include the
application of the exhaustion rule under national law; importantly, this
conclusion casts doubt upon the viability of a rigid exhaustion rule in
cases concerning permissible restraints. Secondly, with respect to
copyright law, the European Commission has relied upon the decision
153
in Coditel v. Ciné Vog Films concerning a very specific issue in relation
to public performance rights, which is ultimately unhelpful for purposes
of arguing in favor of an overall exclusion in relation to a vague notion
of online services. And thirdly, to the extent that the European
Commission relies upon the definition of “online services” outlined in
the Directive on Electronic Commerce, it disregards the fact that, again,
the definition of “services” functions so as to focus the restrictions for
typical Internet services across the board, rather than serving as a role
model for categorizing exclusive rights and their limitations in
154
copyright.
The division between goods and services under the EC Treaty,
therefore, gives no guidance as to the extent to which intellectual
148. See EC Treaty arts. 28, 49.
149. See Herman Cohen Jehoram & Kamiel Mortelmans, Zur “Magill”—Entscheidung
des Europäischen Gerichtshofs, 1997 GRUR INT. 11, 14.
150. Konsumentombudsmannen, 1997 E.C.R. I-3843.
151. Id.; see also EC Treaty art. 30.
152. See Case C-384/93, Alpine Invs. BV v. Minister van Financien, 1995 E.C.R. I-1141;
Case C-288/89, Stichting Collectieve Antennevoorziening Gouda v. Commissariaat voor de
Media, 1991 E.C.R. I-4007, para. 11; Case C-76/90, Säger v. Dennemeyer & Co., 1991 E.C.R.
I-4221.
153. Case 62/79, Coditel v. Ciné Vog Films (Coditel I), 1980 E.C.R. 881.
154. See Council Directive 2000/31, supra note 144.
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property rights can be exercised or limited as a matter of national law.
As far as the scope of the exhaustion rule in relation to online services is
concerned, the negation of exhaustion merely follows from the fact that
a limitation based upon exhaustion could not be argued because the
classification as service systematically forecloses that line of reasoning.
This shows that the regulatory scope of fundamental freedoms and the
acceptable scope of national intellectual property rights are not
identical. It remains an issue of proportionality. By applying this more
accommodating proportionality assessment, the ECJ recognizes the
increasing convergence of industrial sectors and the need to restructure
155
the normative provisions under primary European Community laws.
The jurisprudence does not articulate any terminology that can be
understood as autonomously defining the scope of intellectual property
rights. Hence, inasmuch as the interpretation of Article 30 EC is subject
to an assessment of proportionality, any interpretation of national
norms implementing the European exhaustion rule on that basis results
in circular argumentation.
It necessarily follows that the traditional judicature regarding Article
30 EC, likewise, does not permit an inference in relation to an
understanding of a proprietary exhaustion rule above and beyond the
final act of putting an article on the consumer market.
IV. THE EFFECTS OF HARMONIZING TERRITORIAL RESTRAINTS: THE
BLIND SPOTS
The scope of permissible control can neither safely be deduced from
the rule on the free movement of goods, nor can it be immediately
inferred from competition law. What is clear is that exhaustion will
156
occur once an article is placed on the consumer market; yet, the
interface between exhaustion and permissible restraints remains
dubious as far as restrictions vis-à-vis commercial licenses are
concerned.
Dogmatically, therefore, territorial and other restrictions permitting
exclusivity, which are necessary to maintain the function of an
intellectual property right, supersede the exhaustion principle as long as
it is accepted that Articles 28 through 30 EC are adaptable to the
155. This is obvious in cases where a clear distinction between goods and services is not
possible because the effect of marketing products potentially falls—directly or indirectly—
within both Articles 28 and 49 EC. See EC Treaty arts. 28, 49.
156. This follows simultaneously from the inapplicability of the TTR and VRR to
contracts relating to end consumers and the general exhaustion doctrine limiting intellectual
property rights as implemented in national laws.
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current levels of European market integration. The higher the level of
integration becomes, the less it is necessary to rely on rules aimed at
safeguarding free circulation; at higher levels of integration, the
common market approaches a virtual free trade similar to, for instance,
157
the United States.
A. Partial Inapplicability of Article 30 EC?
To the extent that competition law, including the European
158
Commission’s practices, is becoming more lenient, the effect of
exhaustion and, consequently, the concept of divisibility of control
rights cannot be answered under Article 30 EC; this is, among other
reasons, because certain restrictions are deemed as pro-competitive and,
thereby, shift the scales toward the right owner’s interests. The effect of
competition rules in excess of core regulatory functions in exempting
certain pro-competitive restraints is an exclusionary effect upon the
additional application of Articles 28 and 30 EC—this is, of course,
unless the position is taken that the rule on exhaustion, as a matter of
the free movement of goods, has resulted in a proprietary limitation of
national intellectual property rights or that the implementation of the
exhaustion rule is subject to an identical statutory interpretation in all
Member States.
According to this view, exhaustion occurs as a consequence of
159
licensing, delimiting the potentially more generous scope under
national law and denoting that third parties cannot be bound by
160
permissible restraints. But, as outlined previously, not only is such a
161
position not credible from a doctrinal point of view; but it also ignores
the transformed approach in regard to the territoriality issue and
forecloses any flexibility for adapting pro-competitive effects to an
increased level of market integration. This view aligns with similar
views taken regarding the concept of the cumulative application under
157. The U.S. Patent Act permits territorial restrictions even as applied to a common
national market, but it does curtail the patent owner’s control after the first sale to the
consumer. See 35 U.S.C. § 261 (2000). This solution amounts to a significant step away from
the reward notion. The licensor would be able to control the distribution up to the point
when the article is physically in the hands of the consumer.
158. Commission Decision 95/373, supra note 102.
159. This is the case both as a matter of European Community law, see, e.g., Case 19/84,
Pharmon BV v. Hoechst AG, 1985 E.C.R. 2281, and simultaneously domestic law.
160. More precisely, attempts of a licensor to employ divisible statutory intellectual
property rights in order to divide the market and limit the effects of exhaustion violate the
free movement of goods principle.
161. See supra Part III.A.
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the Patent Licensing Block Exemption, suggesting a corresponding
application of the competition and free movement of goods principle
that a permissible restriction should not simultaneously be subject to
162
additional constraints as a matter of market freedom. Such a position
seeks to overcome the problem of the traditional exhaustion concept by
rendering national intellectual property rights applicable unless
discriminatory or abusive conduct results. Article 30 EC was perceived
as inapplicable to sheer limitations arising out of permissible restraints.
What is crucial in this context is that such an approach had to operate
against the extremely severe interpretation that, by then, unswervingly
163
favored the free movement of goods principle and resulted in the
European license doctrine. An open exclusive licensing agreement
containing permissible clauses, thus, remained unenforceable because
those clauses contravened Article 28 EC. The effect was to curtail a
164
patentee’s right as a matter of fostering market integration, but by
then the jurisprudence on Article 30 EC was in line with both the more
165
restrictive provisions on patent licensing and the accepted perception
166
that exhaustion was inextricably coupled with the act of licensing.
The question now emerges in a different regulatory context to the
extent that the TTR permits control over subsequent sales even in
167
closed licenses allowing absolute territorial protection. If a licensor is
allowed to reserve territories, the application of Article 30 EC in order
to advertently constrain such control would preempt pro-competitive
effects because the licensor would be restricted to seeking contractual
redress against his or her licensee. If, therefore, the TTR and,
168
exempt territorial restrictions by
presumably, Article 81(1) EC
162. See Oliver Axster, Offene Fragen unter der EG-Gruppenfreistellungsverordnung
für Patentlizenzverträge, 1982 GRUR INT. 581. Hence, if the clause in question is enforceable
under national intellectual property laws and does not violate the provisions on anticompetitive agreements, exhaustion does not occur as a matter of European Community law,
although it may occur as a matter of national law. See also Valentine Korah, The Limitation
of Copyright and Patents by the Rules for the Free Movement of Goods in the European
Common Market, 14 CASE W. RES. J. INT’L L. 7 (1982).
163. Venit, supra note 110, at 517.
164. This effect, though, has a certain degree of inconsistency. See GORMLEY, supra
note 132, at 233; Schödermeier, supra note 132.
165. Commission Regulation 2349/84, supra note 49, art. 1 (applying to open exclusive
and nonexclusive licenses only); see Dieter Hoffmann & Orlagh O’Farrell, The “Open
Exclusive License”—Scope and Consequences, 6 EUR. INTELL. PROP. REV. 104, 108 (1984).
166. Case 187/80, Merck & Co. v. Stephar BV, 1981 E.C.R. 2063.
167. See Case 27/87, Erauw-Jacquéry v. La Hesibignonne, 1988 E.C.R. 1919; Case
262/81, Coditel v. Ciné Vog Films (Coditel II), 1982 E.C.R. 3381.
168. In the TTR Guidelines, the Commission asserts that it will apply the same

WESTKAMP ARTICLE

2007]

THE EUROPEAN EXHAUSTION DOCTRINE

325

allowing some degree of proprietary control arising out of statutory
169
rights, then this would denote a shift toward a greater recognition of
intellectual property rights and a partial withdrawal of the free
circulation argument since the permissible exercise on the basis of
harmonized law cannot be discriminatory.
Moreover, an additional question arises: whether Article 28 EC can
apply at all. If territorial restrictions, as a matter of national intellectual
170
property laws, are deemed pro-competitive, then there is no prospect
for additionally being able to invoke Article 30 EC because it may be
argued that a permissible restraint on the basis of European Community
law cannot simultaneously constitute a measure having equivalent
effect; it applies irrespective of possible discrepancies in national laws,
whether or not such restrictions go beyond the national intellectual
property rights, because all intellectual property systems are treated
equally. It may also be suggested that if Article 28 EC applies only with
respect to territorial discrepancies, then the exercise of a permissible
right is not an obstacle to the free movement of goods.
Consequently, there is no capacity for applying a proportionality test
under Article 30 EC because dogmatically the permissibility of
territorial restrictions is resolved under secondary legislation that takes
precedence insofar as it regulates the issues in question, and a
restraining clause is not a result of divergences in the scope of national
intellectual property rights because the rights are still granted as a
bundle of national and, thus, territorial rights. The question of
exhaustion under Article 30 EC, therefore, cannot arise; it can only arise
once national discrepancies in the concrete application of national
intellectual property laws distort the concept of free movement of
goods. Consequentially, the additional applicability of Article 30 EC
will depend upon the scope given to a permissible territorial restriction
under the block exemptions, and the greater the scope is as a matter of
judicial interpretation, the higher the harmonizing effect will be. An
interpretation that permits the owner control until the very act of
putting the article on the market will, therefore, foreclose the
application of Article 30 EC because it harmonizes the scope of national
intellectual property rights to a significant degree. A more constrained

principles to other intellectual property categories as to those expressly covered. TTR
Guidelines, supra note 41, at 10.
169. Commission Decision 95/373, supra note 102.
170. See Hugh C. Hansen, International Exhaustion: An Economic and Non-Economic
Policy Analysis, 6 INT’L INTELL. PROP. L. & POL’Y 114-1, 114-9 to -10 (2001).
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view will engender an expanded scope for national perceptions that, if
divergent, will resurrect the free movement of goods issues.
It follows that, in the sphere of such partial harmonization of
licensing rules, the avenue taken toward a balancing of interests is not
open because Article 28 EC, as a prerequisite, refers to discrepancies
between national laws that have “equivalent effect,” but such effect is
necessarily absent if the rules on restrictive licenses are harmonized
171
within the scope of the TTR or VRR.
Therefore, in relation to the
doctrinal foundation of the exhaustion principle as an element of Article
30 EC, the question of exhaustion cannot arise. Therefore, the
provisions on the free movement of goods cannot be applied to limit the
permissible exercise of intellectual property rights under competition
law.
What can be asserted is that at least some modest level of
harmonization exists, and good reasons can be put forward to preclude
the application of Article 30 EC both as a matter of dogmatic
consistency and for substantive reasons to not revert back to
indiscriminate restrictions on grounds of the free circulation of goods.
The reality, though, is that no true harmonization has been achieved
with respect to the divisibility of the exploitation rights and the
subsequent effects this has on notions of national exhaustion.
B. Territorial Restraints and National Exhaustion Rules
The concept of territorial restraints under competition law shows a
remarkable lack of harmonizing power because it leaves a number of
blind spots. If it permits territorial restrictions as a matter of exercising
national intellectual property rights, it excludes the applicability of
Article 28 EC to the extent that Member States employ identical
concepts of national exhaustion, matching rules with respect to the
effect of territorial restrictions in terms of absolute (proprietary) or
172
relative (contractual) protection.
As will be demonstrated in the
discussion that follows, this is not the case.
National systems may employ different notions of national
exhaustion, particularly in regard to differentiations at varying market
levels. The ambiguity of block exemptions as to the effect of
permissible restraints on exhaustion also triggers a number of blind
spots. Dogmatically, the exclusion of the proportionality test, under
171. See EC Treaty art. 28; see also 2004 TTR, supra note 24; VRR, supra note 25.
172. Such a level of harmonization can be achieved if the scope of permissible restraints
is incorporated into statutory intellectual property laws.
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which the exhaustion principle has developed, implies that Articles 28
through 30 EC cannot be invoked in relation to overriding public
173
interests safeguarding the free circulation of goods. The problem will
have to shift to national law or be reintroduced under a different
heading, such as consumer protection. In turn, the admissibility of
territorial restraints largely depends on national notions of the scope of
licenses.
Under various national laws, the discrepancies are striking and the
correct legal position is often blurred. National laws normally do not
permit territorial restraints, but complex licensing agreements may
involve a division of product markets. Regarding the divisibility of
174
rights, German copyright law, for example, permits the division of
175
distribution rights insofar as distinct product markets are concerned.
This follows from Article 31(4) of the German Copyright Act, which
generally preserves the right of an author to grant mutually exclusive
176
licenses in relation to separate product markets. However, territorial
177
restraints within the jurisdiction are not permissible. The effect of a
contractual restraint upon exhaustion remains dubious, and the extent
to which it can bind a bona fide third-party purchaser is debatable. In
the OEM-Software decision, the German Federal Court of Justice,
Bundesgerichtshof (BGH), rejected any effect of an express limitation
178
on the occurrence of exhaustion.
The court held that imposing an
obligation on a wholesaler to sell certain types of software only when
attached to hardware was unenforceable because exhaustion had
179
occurred at the time when the software was issued to the wholesaler.
The court did not refer to the scope of the contractual limitations, as
such, but it did point to the effects upon consumer protection,
suggesting that copies issued without consent would be exhausted as a
matter of a limitation on proprietary rights, even before the copy had
180
reached the end consumer.

173. See EC Treaty arts. 28, 30.
174. SAM RICKETSON, THE BERNE CONVENTION FOR THE PROTECTION OF
LITERARY AND ARTISTIC WORKS: 1886–1986 400 (1987).
175. See Urheberrechtsgesetz [UrhG] [Authors Rights Act], Sept. 9, 1965, BGBl. 1 at
1273, art. 31(4) (F.R.G.).
176. Id.
177. See GERHARD SCHRICKER, URHEBERRECHT: KOMMENTAR § 17 (2d ed. 1999).
178. Bundesgerichtshof [BGH] [Federal Court of Justice], June 7, 2000, I ZR 244/97
(F.R.G.), available at http://www.jurpc.de/rechtspr/20000220.htm.
179. Id.
180. Id.
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In the United Kingdom, the exact circumstances for the occurrence
181
of exhaustion are debated in a similar way. The exhaustion principle
was introduced into the intellectual property laws of the United
Kingdom only as a consequence of European harmonization. The
traditional view was that a right holder enjoyed an unlimited right to
182
control distribution channels, and intellectual property rights were
183
perceived to be divisible in this regard. Under the laws of the United
Kingdom, the principal issue for exhaustion is identifying the relevant
184
The
stage in a distribution chain in which exhaustion will occur.
general view is that it should do so before the goods reach the consumer
market, although this rationale has been explained with reference to
185
preventing secondary liability for consumers.
Section 18(2) of the
Copyright, Designs and Patents Act, for instance, refers to subsequent
186
acts of distribution with respect to copyrighted works. It is clear that
copies issued without consent will infringe, and a license must be
187
present. The case law, however, varies with regard to the divisibility
of rights and the proprietary effects in cases where consent is limited to
188
certain product or territorial markets. In analyzing this matter, some
189
commentators prefer the “destination theory” while others advocate
190
In France and Belgium, a copyright
for the “disposition theory.”
owner is able to bind third-party purchasers beyond the first market
191
level on the basis of a general destination right—droit de destination.
In the United States, territorial restrictions are generally perceived as
181. John Phillips & Lionel Bentley, Copyright Issues: The Mysteries of Section 18, 21
EUR. INTELL. PROP. REV. 133, 137–38 (1999).
182. See Beecham Group Ltd. v. Int’l Prods. Ltd., [1968] R.P.C. 129, 135–36 (Kenya)
(extending the right to putting articles on the market abroad); Dunlop Rubber Co. v. Longlife
Battery Depot, [1958] R.P.C. 473, 476 (U.K.).
183. See sources cited supra note 182.
184. Phillips & Bentley, supra note 181, 137–38.
185. Id.
186. Copyright, Designs and Patents Act, 1988, c. 48, § 18(2) (Eng.).
187. Id.
188. Nelson v. Rye, [1996] F.S.R. 313 (U.K.) (suggesting that exhaustion does not occur
between a manufacturer and a trader); see also Football Ass’n Premier League Ltd. v. Panini
UK Ltd., [2003] EWCA (Civ) 995 (Eng.).
189. HUGH LADDIE ET AL., THE MODERN LAW OF COPYRIGHT 387–90 (1980).
190. See Infabrics Ltd. v. Jaytex Ltd., [1982] A.C. 1 (regarding secondary infringement
rules under the copyright laws of the United Kingdom); see also Copyright, Designs and
Patents Act §§ 22–26.
191. See FR. S. DEB. 317 (Apr. 28, 1999) (statement of Sen. Danièle Pourtaud),
available at http://cubitus.senat.fr/rap/198-317/198-3170.html; see also Axel Metzger,
Erschöpfung des urheberrechtlichen Verbreitungsrechts bei vertikalen Vertriebsbindungen,
2001 GEWERBLICHER RECHTSSCHUTZ UND URHEBERRECHT [GRUR] 210.
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192

pro-competitive, but antitrust law does not allow restrictions beyond
193
the first sale of a patented article.
These rather divergent approaches result in blind spots. Blind spots
in relation to “pure” territorial restrictions concern the scope of control
over market levels—that is, the occurrence of exhaustion as a matter of
national law. The respective exhaustion rules established in secondary
intellectual property legislation do not deal with contractual divisibility,
nor do the block exemptions. This reintroduces the issues of free
circulation addressed under Article 28 EC, albeit under a different
heading. If the first act of licensing does not exhaust the right, it
becomes a matter of national law to define the scope of intellectual
property licensing to permit the owner control over subsequent acts of
distribution. Therefore, a restriction, territorial or otherwise, in a crossborder licensing contract remains subject to Article 28 EC provided that
it constitutes a measure having equivalent effect. This will be the case if
such a restriction constitutes an indirect restriction, which will normally
be the case if the national intellectual property laws of the countries in
question are divergent on the scope and effect of such a restriction.
As far as territorial restrictions are concerned, the effect of nonexhaustion following the first act of licensing needs to be reconciled
194
with the criteria applicable under Article 81(1) EC. It is clear that the
195
last act of distribution will exhaust the right, but there is tremendous
ambiguity as to the exercise of statutory rights before that point; the
traditional jurisprudence on European exhaustion is unhelpful to the
extent that the rules on territorial restrictions have been relaxed. In
192. United States v. Arnold, Schwinn & Co., 388 U.S. 365 (1967) (finding a territorial
distribution illegal under § 1 of the Sherman Act because it harmed competition among
distributors). The Court’s decision in United States v. Arnold, Schwinn & Co. sparked
controversy that, in turn, generated a considerable amount of scholarly work focusing on the
economic effects of vertical arrangements. Ultimately, territorial restraints could be used to
address the “free-rider phenomenon.” See also Cont’l T.V., Inc. v. GTE Sylvania, Inc., 433 U.S.
36 (1977) (concluding that a per se illegal approach to territorial restraints was fallacious).
The Court pointed out that vertical restraints should be evaluated under the rule of reason.
Id. The lawfulness of a particular vertical restraint depends upon whether the restraint, on
balance, restricts or promotes competition. See Nat’l Soc’y of Prof’l Eng’rs v. United States,
435 U.S. 679 (1978) (interpreting 35 U.S.C. § 261 to allow territorial divisibility of patent
distribution licenses to the whole or any specified part of the United States).
193. United States v. Univis Lens Co., 316 U.S. 241 (1942); Adams v. Burke, 84 U.S. (17
Wall.) 453 (1873). Therefore, if a territorial restriction in a license purports to control conduct
beyond the first sale, the license would not be protected from antitrust scrutiny under § 261 of
the U.S. Patent Act. See 35 U.S.C. § 261 (2000).
194. See EC Treaty art. 81(1).
195. This is true both as a matter of European Community law and as a consequence of
implemented directives concerning the exhaustion rule.
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relation to whether such a restriction may be exempt from Article 81(1)
EC, different criteria will apply. It is an issue of balancing procompetitive effects of, for instance, restrictions placed upon product
markets, such as preventing free riding, with more general concerns,
such as free circulation of goods. The effect is that, due to the
inapplicability of Article 30 EC, inferences have to be derived from the
arsenal of national laws. Conversely, if Articles 28 and 30 EC are
deemed applicable, then the question is one of national divergences
regarding the scope of divisibility of exploitation rights, which then
needs to be justified under Article 30 EC. However, as a matter of the
free movement of goods principle, it is unclear what parameters can be
taken into account. This will induce either a preference for the
196
197
strictest or the most lenient national system.
C. Non-Territorial Restraints and European Exhaustion
If block exemptions permit a rights holder to oppose reimports on
the strength of divided intellectual property exploitation rights devoid
of the exhaustion effect, then the related issue emerges of whether
license clauses restricting the product market can be enforced.
Restrictions imposed upon the product market in which a protected
article may be sold under the stipulations of a licensing agreement are
common. A licensor has an economic interest in being able to separate
product markets. Such separation is permissive under national laws as
long as it does not contravene domestic competition law and go beyond
the scope of the national intellectual property right granted by statute.
The TTR apparently permits such restrictions provided that the
market share thresholds are not exceeded; however, there is no
198
guidance or case law to support this. Even so, the TTR will only apply
provided that the contract, at its core, pertains to more than a supply
199
and distribution agreement, which in most cases will not come to pass.
The VRR allows such separation provided that the agreement pertains
to ancillary intellectual property rights and falls outside the scope of

196. Such a result potentially arises from a lowest common denominator solution under
a general free movement of goods solution.
197. According to the jurisprudence of the ECJ, the scope of intellectual property
rights—in the absence of European harmonization—remains a matter of national law;
therefore, an absolute general preference for the free movement of goods cannot be
surmised. See Case 158/86, Warner Bros. v. Christiansen, 1988 E.C.R. 2605.
198. See generally 2004 TTR, supra note 24.
199. Id. recital (19).
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200

Article 4. But even if such a conclusion can be drawn, it is difficult to
imagine a contract where the intellectual property right, itself, serves as
201
a basis for different markets.
The separability into different market segments does not result from
the territorial nature of the intellectual property rights in the sense that
the rights conferred are still a bundle of national property rights. The
proprietary effect emanates from the substantive rules of national
intellectual property laws and the extent to which those laws allow for
separation into product markets. Likewise, agreements restricting the
ability of licensees to sell in different product markets raise the issue of
exhaustion. If the respective block exemptions permit this restriction, it
remains doubtful whether such a clause has proprietary effect in that the
distribution right has not been exhausted in cases where the articles
have been sold into different product markets. This market partitioning
has the same effect as territorial licenses in that it indirectly impacts
upon the ability of licensees to sell into different markets in other
territories of the European Community. This would then allow the
application of Articles 28 and 30 EC, provided that the respective
distribution rights have not been exhausted, and, at present, this is
largely a problem of national law.
In Germany, for instance, restrictions on product markets are
contractually enforceable vis-à-vis the licensee provided that, from a
commercial standpoint, the markets defined in the agreement are
202
distinguishable.
The question becomes one of whether further sales
by third parties can be controlled by the rights owner on the strength of
the distribution right. In the OEM-Software case, the BGH concluded
that the exhaustion rule prevailed because the national distribution right
under copyright law merely granted a right of putting the article on the
market for the first time without addressing the effect of a proprietary
203
restriction.
Such restrictions have prevailed under the laws of
Germany and the United Kingdom, but in France and Belgium, the
proprietary effect of a distribution license restricted to certain product
204
markets allows functional control of the entire distribution chain.
200. VRR, supra note 25, art. 4.
201. See id.
202. See, e.g., Bundesgerichtshof [BGH] [Federal Court of Justice], Nov. 21, 1958, I ZR
98/57, 1959 GRUR 200, 202.
203. Bundesgerichtshof [BGH] [Federal Court of Justice], June 7, 2000, I ZR 244/97
(F.R.G.), available at http://www.jurpc.de/rechtspr/20000220.htm; see SCHRICKER, supra note
177.
204. See, e.g., Law No. 92-597 of July 1, 1992, art. L. 122-6, Journal Officiel de la
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Hence, the proprietary effect of the restriction is limited to the
copyright owner’s relationship with the first licensee or purchaser, but it
205
cannot be invoked against any further sale. The BGH, thus, favored
206
market freedom over intellectual property rights.
That is, national
exhaustion was deemed to have occurred as a matter of accomplishing a
high level of free circulation. A restriction on product markets that is
permissible under national law can have the effect of indirectly
restricting reimports on a cross-border level, for instance, if the licensor
licenses a manufacturer to sell copies of books only to be sold in book
clubs. Here, the right is exercised, not as matter of an expressly
permissible conduct, but as a consequence of the divisibility of the
statutory right in national law. An attempt to keep out articles from the
original territory amounts to a territorial restriction that is not exempt
due to the nature of the contract. But the substantive rationale is the
same—the division into separate product markets is a device to
encourage intra-brand competition.
From an antitrust standpoint, the extent to which such clauses
should be restricted is an issue of the pro-competitive effects. From a
copyright standpoint, it is an issue of the scope of proprietary
exploitation rights. If it is permissible as a matter of national law, the
competition issue is conclusive because the exercise of divided statutory
rights is within the scope of national laws. In relation to the free
movement of goods, the situation is no different except for the fact that
Article 30 EC can apply due to the effect of the statutory right allowing
market divisions and operability as an obstacle to free trade. The issue
of nondiscriminatory but divergent national rules on exploitation rights
has already been resolved to the effect that it remains a matter of
207
national law to define its scope.
A national rule permitting a more
extensive interpretation vis-à-vis the divisibility of exploitation rights is
functionally no different from the existence of more or less generous
economic rights. The true issue is the ensuing conflict with the domestic
exhaustion principle.
Under general rules of statutory interpretation, this would normally
result in an obligation to construe such exhaustion rules in conformity
République Francaise [J.O.] [Official Gazette of France], July 3, 1992.
205. See, e.g., id.
206. See sources cited supra note 203.
207. See Case 35/87, Thetford Corp. v. Fiamma, 1988 E.C.R. 3585 (permitting the U.K.
relative novelty doctrine); Case 158/86, Warner Bros. v. Christiansen, 1988 E.C.R. 2605
(accepting nondiscriminatory divergences in relation to the specific Danish Lending Right);
see also KORAH, supra note 28, at 300.
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with models under secondary intellectual property legislation, but in
relation to the issue here the legislation remains eerily silent. National
courts must refer to the traditional notions and doctrinal framework of
exhaustion or, alternatively, apply the customarily restrictive European
exhaustion concept.
This is specifically problematic in relation to the fundamental
divergences between the copyright and droit d’auteur systems. The
proprietary scope of exploitation rights will be influenced by the
respective copyright rationales, tending to allow a greater scope of
control within author right systems given the stronger impact of
personality rights. Conversely, in the OEM-Software case, for example,
208
the BGH merely referred to the aim of “free circulation.”
An
209
absolute proprietary effect of divided rights was, thereby, avoided.
Operating within the framework of European law, this view is difficult
to reconcile with the net pro-competitive effects of distribution
agreements, but even on a national level, the prevailing effect of
exhaustion will result in a tendency toward direct sales. The effect may
well be to destroy separate levels in a distribution chain. Therefore,
even if the block exemptions are inapplicable, such restriction may be
210
exempt under Article 81(1) EC.
CONCLUSION
The question of the interface between the principle of free
movement of goods and the restrictive practices in intellectual property
licenses must be assessed with renewed vigor. The block exemptions
now permit territorial and other restraints without addressing the
exhaustion issue per se. From an economic perspective, this permits
inferences based on a pro-competitive rationale of restrictions on both
territorial and product markets.
From a dogmatic standpoint, the problem pertains to the validity of
clauses in licensing agreements that are, therefore, not voided as a
matter of national contract law. It otherwise denotes that rules derived
from secondary legislation are applied based upon the scope of national
intellectual property rights, causing a particular problem of
interpretation. Exhaustion might not occur in cases where secondary
legislation expressly preserves a right to limit licensing territories, and it
208. See supra note 203 and accompanying text.
209. See sources cited supra note 203.
210. See A. Seffer & J. Beninca, OEM-Klauseln unter dem Gesichtspunkt des
europäischen Kartellrechts, 2004 DER IT-RECHTS-BERATER [ITRB] 210, 213.
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would not apply when the agreement in question is not primarily
concerned with intellectual property licensing. Given the very delicate
boundary between vertical restraints and technology transfers, such
211
deduction would certainly lead to legal uncertainty. The better view is
to treat those provisions, as far as exhaustion is concerned, as neutral.
The question that remains concerns the impact of the principle of
free movement of goods. In relation to exhaustion, the question is
whether the notion of a European exhaustion rule—in the sense of a
first sale doctrine—is viable, and, if so, why. There are two ways to
address the issue. The first is to simply agree upon a general rationale
to limit the exercise of intellectual property rights. This approach
appears to be the predominant conclusion derived from the judicature
on parallel imports, and it is supported by the existence of national rules
encompassing the first sale doctrine as a consequence of European
Community legislation in the intellectual property sphere. There are,
however, a number of arguments that reveal that the general notion of a
shared exhaustion rule—that is, the inference of judicature primarily
concerned with limiting the absolute and proprietary scope of
intellectual property rights—is, at the least, misleading.
The
promulgation of an overarching European exhaustion principle has
been, if at all, a response to the dynamics of shaping a single market
rather than an attempt to approximate intellectual property laws.
“Exhaustion” has become a metaphor for a variety of approaches that
sought to delineate permitted and improper exercises of intellectual
property rights regarding the free movement of goods.
The dissenting views, on the other hand, are unpersuasive. The
effect of national laws that are divergent regarding the scope of
divisibility may be to create measures having equivalent effects in the
sense that a more restrictive scope under national law may be exercised
so as to prevent imports; some jurisdictions might allow a greater scope
of control encompassing further market levels. But it is questionable
whether Article 30 EC can address those problems. Although the
212
disparities deemed as “measures having equivalent effect” arise out of
the territorial nature of national intellectual property rights, their
continued applications are different as a result of the respective
proprietary scope of licensing rights under national laws.
If, conversely, Article 30 EC were to be applied with respect to
discrepancies arising from blind spots, which are not harmonized, the
211. See supra Part II.A.
212. EC Treaty art. 28.
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effect would be a lowest common denominator solution based on the
most austere national intellectual property system in order to artificially
invoke the application of the exhaustion rule. Such an approach is
potentially inconsistent with the more lenient treatment of restraints in
licensing contracts. It would bar substantive arguments pertaining to
the rationale of permitting restraints on both territorial and product
markets.
The inadequacy of the current approach is that the very concept of
Article 28 EC relies upon eliminating national discrepancies that
213
constitute measures having equivalent effect.
Its application to
intellectual property has evoked a far-reaching discernment as a general
substantive rule, which, given the dynamics of integration, is neither
conceivable nor desirable. Hence, the exhaustion principle is a line of
argument that resulted from an initial distinction between existence and
exercise and the related specific subject matter test. It may, thus, be
ignored to the extent that national intellectual property rights are
harmonized with respect to the scope of the national exhaustion rule,
and such harmonization is partially achieved by permitting certain
restraints.

213. See id.

